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INTRODUCTION 
Never before has corporate shareholder voting received so much attention from 
lawyers, scholars, and policymakers, nor have the possibilities for shareholder 
voting reform seemed so vast in the political wake of the financial crises of the past 
decade. The Delaware Chancery Court has famously declared that the “shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial 
power rests,”1 but the effective practice of the shareholder franchise to constrain 
board discretion under current law is “largely a myth” in practice.2 Reform 
advocates are pushing for a major expansion in shareholder authority through 
shareholder voting and proxy access that would give shareholders greater ability to 
influence management.3 Advocates of shareholder activism, including Lucian 
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 * Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Many thanks to Bobby Ahdieh, 
Bobby Bartlett, Bill Carney, Julie Cho, Shmuel Leshem, Robert Schapiro, and Fred Tung for 
their feedback on earlier drafts, and many thanks to Will Bradbury, Yilin Chen, Sagiv 
Edelman, Madeline Gwyn, and Caitlin Murphy for excellent research assistance. 
 1. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); see also 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (advising that “[i]f the 
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of 
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out”). 
 2. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 
732 (2007). 
 3. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1347, 1350 (2011) (quoting one expert, among several of the same opinion, as 
characterizing current reform efforts as “the biggest change relating to corporate governance 
ever proposed by the SEC”); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and Its 
Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013) 
(describing current efforts at proxy reform as potentially “revolutioniz[ing] American 
corporate governance”). 
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Bebchuk, call for increased shareholder voting prerogatives, such as the recent 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposals and majority voting rules, 
as a means for restoring accountability to shareholders.4 
However, the case against shareholder voting reform rests on an apparent trump 
card in the debate—the well-recognized problem of rational ignorance that limits 
the effectiveness of shareholder involvement. As Stephen Bainbridge and other 
skeptics on shareholder voting argue, shareholders tend to be rationally apathetic in 
letting management run the company and deferring to their recommendations in the 
usual course of things.5 Information is costly, but the returns to the individual 
shareholder for improving corporate performance are distributed pro rata, such that 
shareholders rarely have individual economic incentive to engage more than 
casually on questions of corporate management. Opponents of reform efforts argue 
that “shareholders lack both the information and the incentives necessary to make 
sound decisions”6 and thus are rationally ignorant voters who would be better off 
vesting authority in management’s hands.7 For this reason, shareholders generally 
do not possess any detailed affirmative vision of how the company should operate 
itself, nor do they typically wish for greater direct ability to instruct management 
on how specifically to run the company.8 Even when given the limited chance to 
vote on corporate matters, shareholders defer to management in almost every case. 
Many commentators therefore oppose shareholder voting reform and instead 
advocate for a model of “director primacy” that places virtually unreviewable, 
centralized corporate control in the hands of the board.9 
In this Article I offer a very specific response, based in political science, to the 
case against shareholder voting reform based on this critique of shareholders’ 
rational ignorance. The challenges of rational ignorance, as well as related 
problems of collective action, that corporate scholars identify as impediments to 
sensible shareholder voting are not at all particular to corporate voting. They are 
basic constraints that confront all types of voting by large, diffuse electorates, 
including voting in democratic government on candidates and policy questions on 
the ballot. Voters overcome these constraints, however imperfectly, by gravitating 
toward heuristic voting strategies that may work equally well in shareholder voting 
and, indeed, may explain why shareholder voting works as it does as currently 
practiced. 
The best example of such strategies are models of retrospective voting from 
political science by which voters vote on the basis of global, ex post assessments of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. See Bebchuk, supra note 2. 
 5. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 
53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 623–24 (2006); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and 
Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 985 (2001). 
 6. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 624. 
 7. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the 
Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003); Robert S. 
Saunders, Why Majority Voting in Director Elections Is a Bad Idea, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
107 (2006). 
 8. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 402–03 (1983). 
 9. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 7. 
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incumbent performance. Just like the typical shareholder, the typical citizen is 
rationally ignorant and knows little about the specifics of government policy. But 
even rationally ignorant citizens can monitor the general state of affairs at low cost 
and reward incumbents for good times, while punishing them for bad times. Of 
course, this manner of retrospective voting is quite imprecise and fails the highest 
aspirations of deliberative democracy, but as a model of inducing the right 
incentives for officeholders, it works reasonably well as a second-best heuristic 
strategy and overcomes pervasive rational ignorance. As voting theorists have 
observed, retrospective voting provides the basic opportunity for even uninformed 
voters to impose democratic accountability by ousting badly performing 
incumbents on the simple basis of ex post results.10 
I argue that it is useful to view shareholder voting through a similar lens. 
Shareholders are rationally ignorant in the sense that they are unlikely to possess ex 
ante sophisticated information or detailed affirmative preferences about the best 
course of company action. For this reason, shareholders are overwhelmingly 
willing to defer to management’s leadership and to its recommendations on 
shareholder votes. However, even rationally ignorant shareholders can monitor 
their company’s performance at low cost with reference to simple proxies like share 
price. Shareholders need not have well-developed affirmative preferences about 
company direction in any specific sense to know when management is doing poorly 
and may need to be thwarted. Indeed, the average shareholder of a public company 
is much more likely, with attention to the company’s share price, to have salient 
negative preferences about management than to have developed affirmative 
preferences about what the board ought ideally to do. What is more, relative to 
voting contexts where many nonfinancial interests may complicate voting 
decisions, shareholder voting is narrowly focused on the maximization of company 
value. 
Shareholders therefore are capable of exercising a degree of ex post 
accountability through retrospective voting, despite their rational ignorance. To do 
so, shareholders need only to keep a running tally about management’s 
competence, informed in large part by the company’s share price, which serves as a 
reliable heuristic about whether to defer to management on the discrete binary 
questions presented to them.11 When the company’s direction changes and status 
quo deference to management is less justified, shareholders can exercise negative 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL 
ELECTIONS (1981); Donald R. Kinder & D. Roderick Kiewiet, Economic Discontent and 
Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in 
Congressional Voting, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 495 (1979); Gregory B. Markus, The Impact of 
Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-
Sectional Analysis, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 137 (1988). 
 11. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 129, 149 (2009) (identifying the “principal signal indicating a deviation of the board 
from its duty to the corporation [as] the market price of the corporation’s stock”); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439, 441 (2001) (“[T]he market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the 
principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.”). But see William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010) 
(criticizing the accuracy of share price as a measure of company performance). 
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preferences—a veto against poor management’s recommendation. When 
management performs poorly, shareholders are more likely to discard deference 
and vote in a negative consensus against management’s position.12 That is, 
shareholders are capable of providing management a great deal of discretion in the 
usual case, but exercising a limited veto when necessary.13 
In fact, this pattern arguably characterizes a great deal of shareholder voting as 
currently practiced. As I describe later, shareholders defer to management 
recommendations in shareholder voting as a basic default choice, consistent with 
their informational disadvantages relative to management. However, when 
shareholders identify poor performance by management, shareholders appear to 
punish management and buck its recommendations at a far greater rate. In short, 
shareholders use their confidence in management as a cue for how to vote in 
relation to management’s recommendation. Shareholders give management wide 
berth, deferring in the vast majority of cases, and exercise their voting rights 
against management only when necessary to defend themselves against discredited 
management. 
Of course, a basic obstacle to retrospective voting of the type seen in 
government elections is that shareholders have little ability to vote out incumbent 
management. Citizens have ample capacity to oust incumbent politicians from 
government office, but the removal of incumbents from the board of directors is 
much more difficult. As the Delaware Supreme Court recently acknowledged about 
board elections, the restrictions on board nomination that enable most candidates to 
run unopposed threaten to render shareholder voting “an empty exercise.”14 State 
and federal corporate law provides virtually no practical way for shareholders to 
defeat a management nominee for the board, at least short of a very expensive 
proxy contest.15 It is this regulatory framework that is contested today. Although 
the SEC’s recent effort to expand shareholder access to the company’s proxy 
materials for nominating board candidates failed,16 it is clear that the political 
debate about shareholder voting will continue, and this issue of what shareholder 
voting reform would achieve is one of the most important matters in corporate law 
at the moment.17 
A limited objective here is to highlight the distinction between the affirmative 
preferences and negative preferences, as I have sketched out so far. What I call 
“affirmative preferences” represent the familiar notion of most preferred outcomes 
that voters might seek as ideal goals for corporate policy in voting on shareholder 
matters. For instance, pursuing an influential, innovative agenda for corporate 
reform, Lucian Bebchuk advocates the expansion of shareholder prerogatives to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833, 862 (2005); see also Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 680. 
 13. See Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 862. 
 14. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008). 
 15. Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy 
Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge 5 (Harvard 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11–052, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695666. 
 16. Id. at 6. 
 17. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 11, at 655–56. 
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permit new affirmative rights of initiation that would allow shareholders to propose 
and dictate major corporate actions that have traditionally been entrusted to the 
board’s discretion. However, most shareholders are typically passive investors with 
incomplete and mainly “negative preferences.” They appear to vote mainly on the 
basis of latent negative preferences against the recommendations of what has 
proved to be bad management, without necessarily possessing any clear affirmative 
vision for what management ought to do in most cases. Shareholder voting based 
on negative preferences, rather than affirmative ones, defines what shareholder 
voting does best. 
In other words, any debate over shareholder voting can be about not only the 
quantum of power that shareholders ought to hold vis-à-vis the board, but also 
about how well the shape of shareholder voting maps onto what shareholders do 
well. The debate over shareholder voting is focused almost entirely on the balance 
of power between shareholders and management, more specifically the limited 
amount of control afforded shareholders.18 The debate contemplates a simple 
tradeoff between giving more power to shareholders and granting discretion to 
management, but as I have argued, shareholders can possess substantively distinct 
types of preferences. If shareholder power should be increased, shareholder voting 
power could be increased in accordingly affirmative or negative directions. If 
shareholders’ salient voting preferences are mainly negative in nature, reforms may 
be most useful when reinforcing shareholder capacity to enforce those negative 
prerogatives without any necessary connection to the ability to effectuate 
affirmative preferences. 
As a consequence, even if critics of shareholder voting are correct that 
shareholders are rationally ignorant, rarely develop specific preferences about what 
the company ought affirmatively to do, and prefer management discretion in almost 
every matter, a case for shareholder voting reform still emerges. Shareholders may 
benefit collectively from stronger veto rights to defend their real and basic negative 
preferences. Recent movement toward majority voting rules and shareholder access 
to the board nomination process are aimed at shoring up the currently marginal 
ability of shareholders to effectuate what can be quite salient negative preferences 
against unwanted board candidates.19 Of course, a model of shareholder voting 
structured and exercised only as veto is less ambitious than what is typically 
contemplated by aspirational democratic theory, but it reflects the basic reality of 
shareholder voting and conforms to the cost-benefit calculus of shareholders. 
Indeed, structuring shareholder prerogatives in terms of ex post oversight and 
negative veto are likely to impose less intrusive interference with centralized 
management by the board than affirmative rights of initiation might. Structuring 
shareholder voting as veto minimizes the theoretical tradeoff between 
accountability and managerial discretion. 
The consequences of shareholder voting as veto are simple but useful. First, in 
spite of the alleged deficiencies of shareholders as voters, shareholders generally 
can be trusted to make sensible veto decisions. Shareholders have the capacity and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Control of Corporate Decisions: 
Shareholders vs. Management, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4115 (2010). 
 19. See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
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information to make these simpler decisions based largely on variable deference to 
management, based on its performance, as a voting cue. As a result, shareholders 
do not vote foolishly as a group against strong management in favor of value-
reducing measures.20 Instead, they tend to vote conservatively, in favor of 
management proposals and board nominees, and against shareholder proposals, just 
as critics of shareholder voting would commend.21 What is more, when 
shareholders vote in favor of shareholder proposals, shareholders tend to vote 
predictably for corporate governance proposals that are value enhancing.22 
Second, shareholder voting reform should play to the reality of shareholder 
voting as veto. That is, shareholder voting reform is on its strongest ground when it 
accommodates shareholders’ limited attention and economized approach to voting 
as a veto decision in response to management. Under these constraints, 
shareholders manage to apply their veto sensibly when they can, but they 
sometimes find insufficient opportunity to apply it at all. For instance, the say on 
pay provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act require advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation.23 Despite a 
great deal of criticism of say on pay, shareholders are likely to perform well in 
evaluating executive compensation and less likely to interfere unduly with 
corporate management, particularly given that these say on pay votes are merely 
advisory.24 Furthermore, shareholders likely would perform sensibly in checking 
executive compensation even if the say on pay votes were binding because 
shareholders would tend to defer to management except in the most egregious cases 
where a check might be useful.25 
Third, shareholder voting as veto helps identify a different type of shareholder 
voting reform that presents a more complicated case—affirmative rights of 
shareholder initiation. Lucian Bebchuk and others advocate the expansion of 
shareholder prerogatives to permit new affirmative rights of initiation that would 
allow shareholders to propose and dictate major corporate actions that have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See Mario Schijven & Michael A. Hitt, The Vicarious Wisdom of Crowds: Toward a 
Behavioral Perspective on Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements, 33 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 1247 (2012). 
 21. One empirical study finds that even when shareholders are dissatisfied with firm 
governance, “average votes of the poorly performing and poorly governed firms are higher 
than 90% across all categories of performance.” Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. 
Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389, 2402 (2009). 
 22. See John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are Shareholder Proposals All 
Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills, 33 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 499, 520 (1998) (“[S]hareholders, rather than being a weak 
link in the chain of corporate governance, can and do become active when there is reason to 
be concerned about managerial activities.”). 
 23. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
 24. Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: 
Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1213, 1216 (2012) (finding shareholders generally give “broad support to management 
pay packages”). But see Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does It 
Create Value?, 46 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 299 (2011). 
 25. See Thomas et al., supra note 24, at 1216. 
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traditionally been entrusted to the board’s discretion.26 These rights of initiation can 
be distinguished as a break from the usual understanding of shareholder voting as 
veto and present different challenges for shareholders and companies. In other 
words, at a critical moment in the debate over shareholder voting, this type of 
reform may be headed in a wrong direction, when the salience of negative 
preferences in shareholder voting suggests the better direction for reform. Unlike 
efforts to reinforce the shareholder veto, rights of initiation may require 
shareholders to obtain more information and go beyond the limited veto function 
that they may prefer. None of this decisively cuts against such proposals, but 
understanding shareholder voting as veto helps identify the distinct challenges and 
opportunities that rights of initiation present. 
Part I presents the basics of shareholder voting in corporate governance and then 
describes the problem of rational ignorance by shareholders that limits their 
engagement with corporate governance. Part II offers a perspective from political 
science for how shareholders might overcome the problem of rational ignorance. It 
describes retrospective voting in which voters need not know ex ante specifics 
about how to vote, provided they can monitor incumbent officeholders at low cost 
and punish them ex post based on their results. Part III explains how retrospective 
voting translates to shareholder voting and argues that it helps explain the empirical 
evidence describing how shareholders vote. It argues that shareholders generally 
defer to management and, as skeptics on shareholder voting argue, appear not to 
have real preferences in the typical case. However, shareholders rise up in reaction 
to poor performance, develop “negative preferences” against further management 
by those incumbents, and vote those preferences by voting against, or vetoing, the 
incumbents’ recommendations. Finally, Part IV offers a few directions for 
shareholder voting reform based on this model of shareholder voting as veto. 
I. SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND RATIONAL IGNORANCE 
The primacy of the shareholder franchise is widely understood as a myth in 
practice under current law.27 Shareholders of publicly traded companies rarely do 
more than rubber-stamp decisions by management, the rhetoric of the Delaware 
court notwithstanding.28 However, these reform efforts are vehemently resisted by 
corporate law scholars and practitioners wedded to a particular vision of the 
“rational, ignorant” shareholder. 
A. The Basics of Shareholder Voting  
Under American corporate law, shareholders vote on company affairs in two 
main instances: they elect the board of directors and vote on proposals by 
management and fellow shareholders.29 Shareholder voting occurs predominantly 
by proxy in advance of the company’s annual meeting. Shareholders, in response to 
the company’s proxy materials, grant a proxy for their shares to vote in a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 869–70. 
 27. Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 732. 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 676. 
 29. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 400. 
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designated manner on a slate of candidates for the board and either up or down on a 
series of proposals by management and, in certain instances, proposals by other 
shareholders.30 Most shareholders of public companies do not appear physically to 
vote their shares at the annual meeting, and overwhelmingly, shareholders tend to 
vote in accordance with management’s recommendations as specified in the 
company’s proxy materials.31 
The ability of shareholders to elect the board of directors appears superficially 
as an important check on management discretion. In the classic account, 
shareholders must delegate management of the company to a centralized group of 
professionals.32 Ownership of the company is thus separated from its control. 
Shareholders are the residual owners of the company and at least putatively have 
interests most tightly aligned with the best long-term interests of the company.33 
However, management in the form of the directors and officers of the company 
may not be properly aligned with the company. The directors and officers may 
wish to promote themselves financially, personally, or professionally at the 
shareholders’ expense through excessive salaries, empire building, or many other 
means that may not benefit the shareholders over the long run.34 Shareholders as 
principals of the company, the argument goes, must exercise discipline over its 
management agents through indirect means, the most prominent of which is board 
elections.35 
The board of directors manages the business and affairs of the company in its 
discretion. The board selects and delegates its formal authority to the chief 
executive officer and a set of company officers, who in turn manage the company 
on an everyday basis under the board’s review and must seek the board’s approval 
for major decisions.36 The directors on the board are formally accountable to the 
shareholders, in the sense that the shareholders hold the right to elect directors on 
an annual basis and, at least in theory, replace directors of whom they disapprove.37 
As the Delaware Supreme Court famously explained, “If the stockholders are 
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate 
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”38 
As a practical matter, however, the ability of shareholders to hold directors 
accountable is very much limited by the usual fact that only candidates nominated 
by the board itself are included in the company’s proxy materials.39 The 
combination of federal and state law, at least at the moment, conspire to deny 
shareholders access to the company’s proxy materials distributed at company 
expense to shareholders in advance of annual board elections.40 Board challengers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. See id. at 399–400. 
 31. See id. at 400. 
 32. See id. at 403. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 679. 
 35. See id. at 680. 
 36. Id. at 679–80. 
 37. Id. at 680. 
 38. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (quoting 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)). 
 39. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 424–25. 
 40. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 696. 
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cannot force the corporation, which is of course managed by the incumbent board, 
to include alternative candidates on the corporate ballot.41 As a result, shareholders 
who wish to nominate an alternate candidate for the board, other than the ones 
nominated by the incumbent board, must pay for the independent solicitation of 
proxies from the shareholders.42 They must pay to have proxy materials mailed to 
shareholders, which in most cases is prohibitively expensive and in excess of any 
expected financial return from successfully replacing the board, as well as provide 
for the legal and administrative costs associated with the proxy filing and challenge 
process with the SEC.43 The regular staggering of board elections over several 
years multiplies the costs of winning board control by requiring two or more 
challenges, a year or more apart.44 Given these expenses of nominating a candidate 
without the board’s cooperation, the incumbent board’s nominee is usually the only 
candidate for a given board seat.45 Shareholders, therefore, are rarely presented 
with more than one candidate per seat even when dissatisfied with that candidate’s 
performance.46 
The shareholder power to vote on management and shareholder proposals also is 
quite limited as a practical matter. Shareholders cannot direct their board to adopt 
any particular course of action. Shareholders hold only a reactive right to approve 
or reject management decisions.47 This right allows the shareholders a veto right 
that blocks management from adopting value-reducing changes without 
shareholder agreement, but it vests the board with nearly exclusive agenda-setting 
power. As a result, when management refuses to adopt value-enhancing changes 
from the status quo, there is no formal mechanism in shareholder voting that 
enables shareholders to force the board to consider them or present them for 
shareholder approval. 
Shareholders have only a limited opportunity for initiating action through the 
shareholder proposal process. Under Rule 14a-8, shareholders have the ability to 
propose “that the company and/or its board of directors take action” by including a 
recommendation or requirement for a shareholder vote at the company annual 
meeting.48 However, this ability is severely circumscribed by a number of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. See id. 
 42. See generally id. at 688–94 (reviewing obstacles, legal and practical, to shareholder 
electoral challenges). 
 43. See id. at 688 n.21 (citing a study finding that the average cost of a proxy contest 
was $368,000). 
 44. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
887 (2002). 
 45. See Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 702 (“Under existing default arrangements, 
shareholders do not have any meaningful power to veto candidates put forward by the board 
in an uncontested election.”). 
 46. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist 
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 
1775 (2006) (“These pro-incumbent features combine with the costs of running a proxy 
contest to produce a corporate election process that functions essentially only when a 
takeover bidder funds a slate to get around a poison pill.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 45–46 (2003). 
 47. See Bebchuk, supra note 2. 
 48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012). 
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exceptions that permit the company management to exclude a shareholder proposal. 
On the one hand, a shareholder proposal must not deal with “a matter relating to the 
company’s ordinary business operations,” but on the other hand, a proposal must 
not regard operations that are not “significantly related to the company’s 
business.”49 The company management is entitled also to exclude shareholder 
proposals that relate to an election for membership on the company’s board of 
directors or “directly conflict[] with one of the company’s own proposals to be 
submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.”50 As a result, the shareholder 
proposal process by design offers a narrow window for shareholder-initiated action. 
Of course, shareholders always possess the option of selling their shares if they 
are unhappy with corporate performance. Although shareholders have little 
effective ability to depose the incumbent board under the current law, dissatisfied 
shareholders can simply follow the “Wall Street” rule and sell off their shares.51 
Indeed, opponents of shareholder activism argue that this threat of exit imposes a 
necessary level of discipline on the board even absent board elections.52 The fear of 
shareholders selling off their stakes, and therefore depressing the company’s value 
in the capital markets, motivates the board to perform well for fear of losing access 
to capital or even a potential takeover. On this extreme end, company 
underperformance that leads to depressed share price attracts hostile bidders who 
might buy control of the company and fire the incumbent management when they 
do. 
However, there is an enormous academic debate over how well the capital 
markets impose board discipline in the absence of accountability to shareholders 
through shareholder voting. Many commentators argue that greater shareholder 
input into corporate management is necessary to provide what they see as an utter 
absence of institutional accountability of directors and officers.53 These 
commentators offer empirical evidence that boards are able to insulate themselves 
sufficiently from takeover threats through the use of staggered boards, poison pills, 
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 50. Id. 
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41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605 (2007). 
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and other familiar defenses,54 and to safely engage in activity that does not 
maximize shareholder value without fear of sanction from shareholders or 
markets.55 
The concern about board accountability gained special salience during the 
financial crisis in 2008. Highly publicized failures of Lehman Brothers, A.I.G., and 
Bear Stearns, among others, precipitated deep worries about how well corporate 
boards were managing risk on behalf of shareholder interests and inspired 
heightened attention to the lack of functional accountability of directors to 
shareholders through board elections.56 Then-SEC chair Mary L. Schapiro noted 
that “[t]his crisis has led many to raise serious questions and concerns . . . about 
whether Boards are exercising appropriate oversight of management, whether 
Boards are appropriately focused on shareholder interests and whether Boards need 
to be more accountable for their decisions . . . .”57 Indeed, in April 2009, the State 
of Delaware had already beat the SEC to the punch and amended its corporate code 
to make it easier for shareholders to nominate director candidates. Delaware law 
changed to permit, but not require, Delaware corporations to adopt bylaws that 
authorize shareholders under certain circumstances to include board nominees in 
the company proxy materials and that allow the company to reimburse shareholders 
for the expense of an independent proxy solicitation.58 
Shortly after Delaware’s reforms, the SEC released new proposed rules that also 
would have amended the federal proxy rules and made it easier under certain 
circumstances for shareholders to nominate a candidate for a company’s board of 
directors.59 New Rule 14a-11 would have required a company to include in the 
company’s proxy materials a board candidate nominated by a shareholder who 
owns—subject to certain conditions—at least 3% of the company’s securities 
entitled to vote on the election of directors.60 The amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) 
proposed relaxation of the “election exclusion” such that a company would not be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor 
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 56. See, e.g., JOHN GILLESPIE & DAVID ZWEIG, MONEY FOR NOTHING: HOW THE FAILURE 
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 57. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting on Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009). Of course, putting aside the political 
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 58. H.B. 19, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009). 
 59. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 
10, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249 & 274). 
 60. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,787–88 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (adopted Aug. 25, 2010), vacated in part by Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 
F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This ownership threshold was later reduced from 5% to 3%. Id. 
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permitted to exclude a shareholder’s proposal and supporting statement in its proxy 
materials to amend the company’s nomination procedures or disclosures with 
respect to shareholder nominations.61 Together, these proposed rules allowed 
greater shareholder access to the company’s proxy materials with respect to board 
nominations and greater shareholder ability to fight off company attempts to 
disallow such access. 
The SEC presented its proposals as necessary for board accountability to 
shareholders. As Schapiro explained, the SEC intended these proposed rules to 
“turn what would otherwise be a somewhat illusory right to nominate into 
something that is real—and has a real chance of holding boards of directors 
accountable to company owners.”62 Shareholders who own a nontrivial stake in a 
company would have had the right under the proposed new Rule 14a-11 to include 
board nominees in the company proxy materials and need not have incurred the 
costs of a separate proxy solicitation.63 New Rule 14a-11 would have dramatically 
reduced the cost of challenging incumbent directors and therefore would have 
introduced new competition to what were usually noncompetitive elections. The 
SEC’s proposals followed two attempts during the previous six years to change the 
proxy rules,64 but they were not implemented because of a successful legal 
challenge by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable.65 The 
future of proxy access is therefore still very much up in the air. 
The federal government has acted with respect to say on pay reform. Say on pay 
is a corporate governance measure that requires a nonbinding advisory vote by 
shareholders on a company’s executive compensation.66 Although say on pay has 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Dialectical Regulation of Rule 14a-8: Intersystemic 
Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 165 (2007) (describing the politics of 
Rule 14a-8 leading to the SEC proposal). 
 62. Schapiro, supra note 57. 
 63. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) 
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shareholder proposal endorsing proxy access received majority shareholder support during 
the previous two years. The SEC abandoned its 2003 effort when the Commission could not 
reach agreement on how to proceed, and a later 2007 effort that resembles the 2009 
proposals also was abandoned under similar circumstances. See Carolyn M. Check & 
Michael R. Miller, Empirical Study, Determining Shareholder Access: Examining 
Shareholder-Management Relationships Through the Differing Lenses Used by the SEC and 
the “Common Law” of Corporate Bylaws, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297, 297–303 (2009) 
(describing these developments). 
 65. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 66. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
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been suggested for years, it was implemented in the United States on a 
comprehensive basis only recently as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act.67 The say on pay provisions of Dodd-Frank require 
that at least once every three years, every public reporting company under the 1934 
Act must include in its proxy statement a nonbinding resolution subject to a 
shareholder approval on the compensation of the named executive officers as 
disclosed in the company’s annual report.68 The theory of say on pay was to 
interject a requirement of shareholder consent, albeit nonbinding, into company 
decision making about escalating executive compensation. 
Shareholders also have pushed for voting reform with increasing success when it 
comes to majority voting rules. Although corporate law before the 1980s typically 
required a majority vote for election of a director to the board, Delaware and most 
states now require only that a board nominee receive a plurality of shareholder 
votes for election to the board, notwithstanding abstentions or withheld votes.69 As 
a result, if the incumbent board nominates only one candidate, that candidate’s 
election is a fait accompli with nothing more than a single vote. The barriers to 
candidate nomination, combined with the plurality rule, conspire to assure the 
incumbent board’s preferred result—typically the reelection of incumbent 
directors—and quash all electoral pressure in all but the rarest, costliest 
circumstances. But large institutional investors, such as the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), have pressured companies to adopt 
majority voting rules for board elections.70 Under a majority voting rule, even an 
uncontested candidate for the board must receive at least a majority of the 
shareholder votes cast to gain or retain a board seat. 
Given the difficulty of challenging the board’s nominees, institutional investors 
argued that a majority voting rule is necessary in uncontested elections to ensure 
that unhappy shareholders are able to veto the election of disfavored candidates.71 
In 2005, Pfizer Inc. led the way in requiring that a director who fails to receive a 
majority of shareholder votes resign from the board.72 By 2009, roughly two-thirds 
of the companies comprising the S&P 500 had adopted some form of majority 
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voting for board elections,73 leading one leading practice guide to conclude recently 
that “[i]t is clear today that majority voting will become universal.”74 
It is no surprise that institutional investors are leading the charge on majority 
voting rules and other governance reforms.75 Institutional investors now own 
roughly two-thirds of the outstanding shares of public equity, compared to less than 
10% in 1950.76 Just as importantly, a number of institutional investors, including 
CalPERS, have become increasingly activist in publicly campaigning against board 
decisions, engaging in proxy fights, and pressing for a greater role for shareholders 
in corporate governance.77 These groups have been influential in not only the 
widespread adoption of majority voting rules, but also efforts on shareholder access 
to the proxy ballot, elimination of staggered boards, and executive compensation.78 
What is more, these groups have successfully coordinated their efforts with one 
another with the help of entities such as Institutional Shareholder Services, which 
acts as an advisory service among institutional investors on shareholder concerns.79 
In short, academic and political debate over the proper measure of shareholder 
influence through shareholder voting, and the shape it should take, is hotly 
contested. Advocates for greater shareholder influence have gained a great deal of 
ground against traditional resistance, with majority voting rules perhaps only an 
early sign of several reforms to follow. As Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock observe, 
“[n]ever has voting been more important in corporate law.”80 
B. The Rationally Ignorant Shareholder 
As a general matter, the debate over shareholder voting in corporate law centers 
on the amount of control shareholders should exercise over directors. As Adolph 
Berle and Gardiner Means set out the basic problem of corporate law, shareholders 
are the residual owners of the corporation, but as a large, diffuse group beset by 
collective action problems, shareholders of public corporations delegate and 
centralize management authority under corporate law to a board of directors.81 This 
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separation of ownership and control of the company, between shareholders and the 
board, poses a principal-agent problem for which shareholder voting is one 
solution.82 Corporate law sets the balance between accountability and authority for 
the board, and as Stephen Bainbridge puts it, “[e]stablishing the proper mix of 
discretion and accountability thus emerges as the central corporate governance 
question.”83 
Many corporate law scholars, as well as corporate law practitioners, argue that 
this balance should always be set in favor of authority for the board, rather than 
accountability through shareholder voting. They argue that accountability to 
shareholders, at least any greater accountability than currently provided by 
corporate law, would be counterproductive because of the inherent challenges of 
collective decision making that beset shareholders of large, publicly traded 
companies.84 At least for such public companies with dispersed ownership, it is 
highly unlikely that the multiplicity of shareholders will remain well informed 
about the company’s affairs and then achieve collective agreement on the best 
course of action for their company.85 
First, the high costs of information and coordination quickly outweigh the pro 
rata benefits a single shareholder will receive as a function of her ownership stake. 
Any shareholder must invest real resources into monitoring the company’s 
operations and business, as well as developing a plan for future action. Determining 
the best course of action for a public company in a complex, international economy 
filled with contingency is difficult to achieve from outside the unique position and 
information of company management. Particularly for investors in public 
corporations with dispersed ownership, it does not usually make economic sense to 
develop an affirmative agenda for the corporation when the directors and officers of 
the corporation have better information and more resources to do so on an ongoing 
basis. What is more, any benefits that the company realizes from following the 
shareholder’s designs would accrue to the shareholder on only a pro rata basis, 
proportionate to her shareholdings, while the costs would be borne entirely by 
herself. As a result, Bainbridge argues that shareholders quite naturally become 
“rationally apathetic.”86 
Second, even if shareholders decided against economic interest to remain well 
informed about their companies, shareholders as a large group face classic 
collective action problems. The large size of any shareholder group complicates its 
ability to achieve consensus about even simple decisions. As the number of 
shareholders increases, the diversity of interests, expertise, and information among 
shareholders also increases, as does then the diversity of their preferences with 
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respect to the company. What is more, as the number of shareholders increases, so 
too do the basic challenges of communication and coordination among the group. 
For all these reasons, Bainbridge concludes that “at the most basic level, the 
mechanical difficulties of achieving consensus among thousands of decision-
makers impede shareholders from taking an active role.”87 
By contrast, management by the board places centralized control in a small, 
specialized group armed with the best information about the corporation’s 
performance, opportunities, and best interests over the long run.88 Bainbridge 
explains that “[t]he chief economic virtue of the public corporation is . . . that it 
provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of 
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, managers, 
shareholders, creditors, and other inputs.”89 In the view of Bainbridge and other 
opponents of shareholder activism, “directors cannot be held accountable without 
undermining their discretionary authority.”90 Reforms that would increase board 
accountability to the shareholders also necessarily threaten the critical benefits of 
centralized discretion in the board. Opponents of reforms such as the Rule 14a-11 
amendments and majority voting requirements argue that centralized corporate 
management by directors and officers of the public corporation is critical to 
American corporate success.91 In their view, rather than assume the costs of 
managing the company for themselves, shareholders are better off delegating 
management ex ante and simply selling their stakes in companies if company 
performance is bad.92 
Based on these concerns, critics of shareholder voting oppose expansion of 
shareholder influence through shareholder voting and the proxy process.93 The 
insulation of management from shareholder influence allows the board to act with 
centralized authority in the best interests of the company without the irrational or 
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narrowly self-interested pressures from shareholders. Bainbridge argues that “the 
substantial efficiency benefits that follow from the separation of ownership and 
control justify retaining the current regime of limited shareholder voting rights as, 
at the very least, the default rule.”94 Lynn Stout similarly criticizes recent calls for 
shareholder voting reform as ignorant of the need for management discretion and 
simply “driven by sentiment and the unspoken assumption that shareholder 
democracy, like Mom and apple pie, must be a good thing.”95 Bainbridge, Stout, 
and others, in other words, approve of the status quo in shareholder voting. The 
status quo offers strict limitations on shareholder influence and therefore preserves 
the broad managerial discretion that they so value.96 
II. VOTING AS VETO AND RATIONAL IGNORANCE 
The standard critique of shareholder voting draws strength from the notion that 
shareholders are rationally ignorant about the affirmative management of the 
company, are content to defer to the board, and therefore add no value in actively 
participating in corporate governance.97 However, shareholders need not satisfy the 
informational and coordination requirements described by critics of shareholder 
voting. In fact, voters in other contexts engage effectively in what I describe here as 
retrospective voting despite similar constraints on information and coordination. 
Corporate scholars and practitioners are correct to argue that shareholders of 
public companies generally do not have well-developed affirmative preferences 
about the management of those companies. That is, average shareholders of major 
public corporations generally do not possess particular designs for the company’s 
best course of action, nor may they want to consider and invest in developing a 
sense of such.98 Shareholders, as Bainbridge and others explain, tend to be 
rationally ignorant regarding the optimal course of action for a corporation because 
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the information costs are extremely high and the pro rata benefits unlikely to be 
commensurate.99 
However, shareholders as voters are little different in this sense than voters in 
many other contexts. Citizens voting in government elections and choosing among 
candidates for public office face almost the identical calculus of rational ignorance. 
The cost of information for citizen voters is high, ranging across many government 
issues of immense complexity, and the average individual payoff from a voter’s 
preferred outcome is terribly small. Indeed, the material incentive for an individual 
voter to attend to her vote in government election may be lower on average than in 
shareholder elections for public companies. Unlike the general rule of one vote per 
share in shareholder voting, each citizen in the typical government election is 
constitutionally limited to only one vote per election, which means that the 
likelihood any individual citizen’s vote choice will be decisive and therefore matter 
at all is negligible for all practical considerations. 
Voting in government elections nonetheless effectively translates public 
preferences. Voters manage to overcome rational ignorance by developing certain 
shortcuts for generating rational voting preferences that map their interests and 
voting those preferences in elections. Accounts of retrospective voting, as 
articulated by Morris Fiorina and others, explain that voters need not develop 
deeply informed opinions about specific issues and candidates’ stances on them.100 
Instead, voters can keep a running tally of retrospective evaluations of the parties’ 
performances and promises, and then apply the running tally as a basic voting 
guide for or against candidates of those parties. Even more simply, retrospective 
voters may simply assess the state of the country as a proxy for the incumbent’s 
performance and then vote accordingly for or against the incumbent based on that 
assessment.101 Although this type of retrospective voting may fail deliberative 
ideals about civic engagement and voting, it enables rationally ignorant voters to 
know enough to identify how they should vote and to protect their interests by 
voting out unsatisfactory officeholders. 
Models of retrospective voting are voters’ creative response to the problem of 
rational ignorance. As Fiorina explains, even uninformed voters “typically have 
one comparatively hard bit of data: they know what life has been like during the 
incumbent’s administration.”102 This bit of data about incumbent performance 
serves as a useful information shortcut about the how the voters should vote in the 
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coming election. Voters can hold the incumbent accountable for her performance 
ex post through their next vote and thereby induce the right incentives ex ante for 
the incumbent without collecting the necessary information to make a fully 
informed decision at the beginning. In this view, voters care more about results 
than the specific policies used to reach those results.103 When things are going well, 
voters are likely to keep the incumbent in office as a default choice without 
knowing much about policy specifics, but when things are going poorly, voters can 
drop their usual deference to the incumbent and replace her. 
One consequence of retrospective voting is that elections often are effectively a 
referendum on the incumbent’s performance, particularly when the incumbent is in 
the race. To give one salient example, the 1984 presidential election was almost 
entirely a referendum on voters’ feelings about incumbent President Ronald 
Reagan.104 Almost all surveyed respondents who voted for President Reagan 
explained that they voted primarily for him, rather than against the challenger 
Walter Mondale. However, almost half of the surveyed respondents who voted for 
Mondale explained that they were voting against Reagan instead of primarily in 
support of Mondale. The challenger Mondale was largely a standby alternative to 
be considered only by voters dissatisfied by the incumbent as a threshold matter. 
This type of incumbent-based shortcut for voters generalizes far beyond the 1984 
presidential elections to help explain election outcomes based on voter perceptions 
of incumbent performance, usually based on economic conditions, in the United 
States at both the national and state level.105 
Even further, voters defer to the incumbent’s recommendations when the 
incumbent is seen as performing well. Voters economize not just in their election 
choices among candidates, but also in their decisions on specific policy questions 
put to them on the ballot. In direct democracy, voters face the same daunting 
informational challenges that they do for candidate elections, and they opt for a 
similar strategy of heuristic voting in deciding how to vote on a specific ballot 
question over public policy. When the incumbent is performing well, voters defer 
to the incumbent’s endorsement and take her cue on how to vote on specific ballot 
questions.106 Of course, this type of heuristic voting makes basic sense for 
rationally ignorant voters. They defer to the more informed judgment of an 
incumbent who has earned their trust by way of past performance and deviate from 
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the incumbent’s judgment mainly when past performance no longer inspires the 
same confidence. Voters execute the basic strategy of deferring to incumbent 
officeholders, both in returning them to office and in voting for their policy 
recommendations, when they appear to be doing a good job. 
Just like retrospective voters in government elections, shareholders generally 
defer to incumbents in office. In shareholder voting on management’s board 
nominees, major transactions, and management proposals, shareholders 
overwhelmingly tend to defer by voting to approve management’s direction.107 For 
shareholder proposals, shareholders again defer overwhelmingly to management’s 
position and vote against such proposals consistent with management direction.108 
This general deference to the board, coupled with the institutional advantage of 
management, means that board-nominated candidates for director and proposals 
from management tend overwhelmingly to win approval from shareholders, just as 
management recommends.109 Without knowing much detail about the company, 
shareholders defer in the usual course to management. 
However, this deference can be overcome when company performance is 
disappointing. Despite rational ignorance on details, shareholders are excellently 
positioned to monitor company performance because “they are uniquely sensitive 
to the principal signal indicating a deviation of the board from its duty to the 
corporation: the market price of the corporation’s stock.”110 When company 
performance is disappointing, shareholders appear to use company performance as 
a proxy for management performance and punish management accordingly.111 For 
instance, when company performance lags by objective measures, shareholders 
become less deferential to management and are more likely to vote for a 
shareholder proposal against management’s recommendation.112 Deference appears 
to wane in particular when a trusted institutional investor takes the lead and 
advocates the passage of a shareholder proposal against management’s 
recommendation.113 
Shareholder voting in these basic respects resembles models of heuristic voting 
from political science. Identification of an affirmative preference for the 
corporation in terms of corporate strategy may require new information and 
consideration of all feasible alternatives that voters simply may not care enough to 
engage. However, shareholders need far less information to monitor management 
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and apply certain negative preferences against management when appropriate. 
Shareholders need not develop costly affirmative preferences about company 
affairs by keeping informed about the details of the corporation’s business 
operations and specific management decisions.114 Instead, they simply maintain a 
standing opinion about management and the company’s overall performance under 
its control, which serves as a heuristic for shareholders’ voting judgments. 
Shareholders shake out of their general deference to management when their 
retrospective assessment of the management’s performance is negative. 
This negative, retrospective model of voting also helps ease problems of 
collective action among voters. Rather than purporting to identify a single 
affirmative preference among many shareholders, shareholder voting might be best 
structured to track a more modest objective—vetoing only those choices that are 
unacceptable to an overlapping consensus among those shareholders. Not only can 
shareholders overcome the cost of information for important questions of negative 
preference, consensus among shareholders is easier when framed as a question of 
negative preference. Shareholder voting, even with a large number of shareholders, 
need not dissolve into an Arrovian voting paradox that many critics of shareholder 
voting imagine. 
Indeed, certain classic treatments of democratic theory and public choice 
contend that elections can establish accountability only through such negative, 
retrospective accounts of voting. Joseph Schumpeter identified in his critique of 
democracy the same problems of rational ignorance and collective action that 
critics of shareholder voting allege, claiming that the average citizen is “a member 
of an unworkable committee, the committee of the whole nation, and this is why he 
expends less disciplined effort on mastering a political problem than he expends on 
a game of bridge.”115 As a consequence, it was impossible to speak of officeholders 
carrying out an affirmative popular will, which required far greater motivation and 
coordination among average citizens than practiced democracy could support. 
Schumpeter, and later William Riker, along similar lines, thus challenged what they 
saw as this “populist” understanding of democracy that set its goals as the 
realization of voters’ affirmative preferences through voting and elections.116 
However, Schumpeter and Riker did not dismiss voting and democracy as 
unworkable. Instead, they argued that democratic government does not collapse, 
despite the problems of rational ignorance and collective action, because the mass 
public readily accepts elected incumbents and generally defers to its leadership.117 
Voting and democracy provide accountability in a much more limited but important 
sense than in the populist understanding. Voting produces accountability in the 
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public’s conditional, intermittent power to end the incumbents’ reign. As William 
Riker put it in his similar critique, “[l]iberal democracy is simply the veto by which 
it is sometimes possible to restrain official tyranny.”118 
Along related lines, I argue in recent work that positive and normative 
conceptions of voting are fixated on affirmative preferences and neglectful of these 
negative preferences.119 The most familiar voting tool for effectuating negative 
preferences is the formal right of unilateral veto, where one voter can block a 
particular alternative from winning approval. But collective voting can be oriented 
to aggregate negative preferences of many voters and decide by election what 
choices will not be made. Under this reversal of the usual assumptions, voting 
offers no guarantee that the electorate’s most preferred choice will be selected or 
realized, but instead, voting is designed to block the electorate’s least or lesser 
preferred outcomes from coming to pass. 
In fact, voters often subjectively care more about vetoing unwanted outcomes 
than they care about achieving their most desired outcomes. Voters at times have 
less idea about what they most prefer, in terms of affirmative preferences, than 
what they do not want and would veto if they had the chance.120 Indeed, a wide 
body of research from psychology finds that people place greater value, 
importance, and weight on events that have negative, rather than positive, 
consequences for them.121 As a cognitive matter, people appear to decide upon their 
negative preferences before their affirmative preferences and rely upon them more 
heavily to reach all types of decisions.122 Voters within a particular context 
therefore may be sensibly efficient to satisfice and focus mainly on fulfilling their 
negative preferences rather than developing clear affirmative preferences. 
Voters’ negative preferences, such as anticandidate feelings, are often the most 
salient, intensely held preferences that voters hold at all in a particular voting 
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context.123 Voters in a political election, for instance, may care much more about 
ensuring the defeat of a particular candidate, or type of candidate, than they care 
about the individual victory of their most preferred candidate.124 Voters may care 
little in particular about most judicial races, content to reelect or retain almost all 
incumbents, but nonetheless may have very intense negative preferences against 
certain judges who become individually controversial or salient.125 Along the same 
lines, rationally ignorant shareholders, who know little about the specifics of the 
company’s business or what specifically the company ought to change, can develop 
clear negative preferences against poorly performing management and act on those 
preferences in shareholder voting. 
This negative conception of voting as veto is actually more familiar than it 
might initially seem across many different voting contexts. As I document 
elsewhere, voting systems from contemporary run-off elections to the ancient 
Greek practice of ostracism have been oriented to recognize mainly negative, 
oppositional preferences of voters.126 Even in voting systems that are not so clearly 
designed to track negative preferences, negative preferences still decide voting 
behavior on a regular basis. Indeed, in some contexts, negative preferences may be 
the only meaningful preferences that voters hold. Voters in judicial retention 
elections, for example, appear to vote almost unthinkingly to retain as a default, 
with very little information about individual judges, except that they occasionally 
vote very real negative preferences about particular judges whose performances 
become publicly controversial.127 
Of course, adopting an explicitly negative orientation for voting as veto makes 
much less sense in certain voting contexts. Public elections are often hoped to be 
collective participatory processes that foster collective affiliation, community 
bonding, and civic efficacy. Orienting voters to think and vote negatively against 
their least preferred choices, instead of mobilizing behind a most affirmatively 
preferred candidate, diminishes these positive qualities of public elections and 
directs public affairs instead in negative directions. What is more, a focus on 
negative preferences can be socially disruptive when voters are required to identify 
their least preferred choices and vetoed candidates may carry a particular stigma 
from being chosen as the worst alternative among the eligible. Voting as veto and 
formal recognition of negative preferences, instead of affirmative ones, does not 
always make sense. 
However, the costs of orienting voting toward negative preferences are not 
likely to be worrisome in the context of corporate shareholder voting. The 
aspirational expectations of public elections are simply absent for shareholder 
voting because it tends to be so focused narrowly on instrumental concerns about 
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company value.128 In addition, social disruption among shareholders and 
management is not a significant concern in large public corporations where 
shareholders and management have little personal contact, and a certain level of 
disagreement is untroubling between shareholders and management. 
To a significant degree, corporate shareholder voting follows the same pattern as 
negative, retrospective voting in other contexts. The rational ignorance of 
shareholders does not necessarily doom the development of negative preferences 
which voting can be structured to recognize. Shareholders may thus have an 
incomplete set of preferences but still have salient preferences about the worst-case 
scenarios.129 Shareholders who generally would defer to management when things 
are going well might still hold very negative preferences against management’s 
direction once the company performs poorly over time. Shareholders need not 
understand everything to know how they feel about a few things, particularly when 
company performance is bad. 
III. VOTING AS VETO IN SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
Shareholders passively defer to management direction an overwhelming portion 
of the time, but at the same time, they can monitor company performance at low 
cost and punish management when they perceive the company to be managed 
poorly. Shareholders who regularly defer to management when the company is 
performing well, and appear not to have real preferences about company direction, 
can develop negative preferences against management when the company performs 
poorly and act on those very real preferences through shareholder voting. This 
understanding of how shareholder voting works in practice suggests why 
shareholder voting works where it does and guides shareholder-voting reform 
positively toward the realities of how shareholders vote. 
A. The Structure of the Shareholder Veto 
Under current American corporate law, whatever influence shareholders 
exercise over the company’s affairs can be understood as structured mainly in terms 
of negative rights. There is little pretense of shareholder rights of affirmative 
initiation in corporate management. As Lucian Bebchuk summarizes, a “central and 
well-settled principle of U.S. corporate law is that all major corporate decisions 
must be initiated by the board [of directors].”130 The board, and corporate officers 
subordinate to the board, manages corporate affairs without shareholder discretion 
or affirmative authority to command particular action. Besides the ability to vote on 
election of directors to the board, shareholders possess only limited rights to deny 
action on fundamental matters of corporate policy proposed by the officers and 
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directors of the company.131 The requirement of shareholder approval for certain 
corporate actions effectively constitutes at best a shareholder veto with respect to a 
limited set of actions. 
This legal structure, as it currently stands, is tailored to shareholders’ rational 
ignorance. The limited category of questions presented for a vote to shareholders, at 
least for publicly traded companies, effectively binds the range of issues that 
shareholders need to consider. Most of these decisions are presented to 
shareholders for a vote as a binary choice—shareholders either vote for or against 
candidates for the board, for or against shareholder proposals or corporate 
transactions, for or against the appointment of auditors, and so on. This structure 
accommodates the fact that shareholders are a collective “whose vocabulary is 
limited to two words, ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’”132 The narrow framing of both the types of 
decisions presented to shareholders and the range of alternatives offered on those 
decisions limits the challenges of collective choice.133 
Opponents of shareholder activism, such as Bainbridge, argue that extension of 
shareholder voting under current reform proposals would interfere with the board 
and management’s centralized operation of the company. In Bainbridge’s view, for 
instance, “directors cannot be held accountable without undermining their 
discretionary authority.”134 Most proposals for shareholder reform provide stronger 
ex post oversight rather than ex ante control over management decisions, but 
Bainbridge argues that this distinction is one in form only because “giving 
investors this power of review differs little from giving them the power to make 
management decisions in the first place.”135 In his view, there is a zero-sum 
distribution of power between shareholders and the board along a single 
continuum—any serious reform that gives stronger oversight to shareholders 
threatens in equal measure to undermine the critical value of centralized 
management discretion.136 For this reason, Bainbridge concludes that “[t]here ought 
to be a rebuttable presumption in favor of preservation of managerial discretion.”137 
Underlying such a presumption must be a faith that current law strikes a 
reasonably efficient balance between accountability and managerial discretion. Of 
course, ignoring any tradeoff between accountability and managerial discretion and 
single-mindedly maximizing shareholder accountability without considering the 
reduction in managerial discretion would be a mistake. None of the current reform 
proposals, however, come close to doing so. As one commentator explains, current 
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proposals operate in a middle ground and are “reform[s] in favor of somewhat more 
accountability at the expense of some, but far from a total, loss in authority.”138 The 
relevant question is the identification of the most efficient balance between the 
values of accountability and managerial discretion and how well current law and 
reform proposals approach that optimal balance. 
On this question, current law fares only so well under the empirical research to 
date. A rich body of work suggests that the balance set by current law is too far in 
favor of managerial discretion, at the expense of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and 
Jesse Fried, for instance, argue that excessive discretion, and lack of accountability 
to shareholders, on the part of management helps explain the extremely high levels 
of executive compensation relative to that in other industrialized countries.139 
Bebchuk, in other work with Guhan Subramanian and John Coates, finds staggered 
board arrangements—which make it more difficult to replace the incumbent 
board—depress shareholder value by increasing the likelihood that company 
management is insulated against hostile bids for control.140 Nonetheless, more than 
two-thirds of companies whose shareholders had passed precatory resolutions to 
repeal their respective company’s staggered board arrangement from 1997 to 2003 
had not repealed their staggered board.141 In other words, a comfortable majority of 
companies whose shareholders voted to repeal staggered boards had defied their 
shareholders by retaining a feature of corporate governance that insulates 
management and thereby depresses shareholder value. It is far from obvious that 
current law sets the right balance between accountability and managerial discretion 
when managers exercise not only centralized authority, as prescribed by Bainbridge 
and others, but also enjoy such deep insulation from shareholders. 
However, an emphasis on shareholders’ negative preferences, as a right of veto, 
may be the most promising path to preserving the traditional advantages of the 
separation between ownership and management. Oversight through negative veto 
allows the board to operate on a regular basis without the interference of the 
shareholders, who lack the information and operational expertise of the company’s 
board and management. Requirements of shareholder approval instantiates only a 
periodic opportunity for the protection of the shareholders’ negative preferences. 
Oversight through negative veto, in other words, empowers the board to act on its 
discretion, just what advocates of “director primacy” so value about the American 
corporate model, subject only to the possibility of veto in the background.142 By 
contrast, affirmative rights of initiation for shareholders appear to pose clearer ex 
ante interference with the management discretion in the best interests of the 
corporation.143 
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Indeed, reinforcing shareholders’ veto rights may be the best way to balance 
board accountability and discretion in a way that closely fits shareholders’ interests 
as a class. Because of the calculus of rational ignorance, shareholders do not 
necessarily want the burdens of becoming more informed and developing 
affirmative preferences about the best designs for the corporation. A simple but 
effective right of veto would be enough for many shareholders as a check on 
management.144 
Robert Thompson and Paul Edelman argue along similar lines that shareholder 
voting occurs, and should occur, only when it advances the goal of “error 
correction” vis-à-vis corporate management.145 Thompson and Edelman clarify that 
shareholder voting improves the corporate decision-making process when it permits 
shareholders to correct errors by corporate management,146 but not necessarily 
when it goes beyond this capacity.147 Notably, though, Thompson and Edelman do 
not understand their approach in terms of shareholder preferences. In fact, they 
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argue that shareholder voting should be understood as “no longer merely an 
aggregation of preferences, but rather an aggregation of information” about what 
will maximize share price.148 Assuming that shareholder preferences are generally 
driven by a focus on share price, as I do, there is no real difference between their 
focus on “error correction” and my focus on negative preferences. 
Thompson and Edelman’s real point, I think, is that shareholders are well 
positioned to develop and vote on negative preferences about corporate 
management in ways that they are not similarly positioned with respect to 
affirmative preferences. I agree. However, Thompson and Edelman strain to 
articulate their approach as one focused on error correction and information, in 
contradistinction to shareholder preferences, in the absence of a conceptual 
vocabulary of affirmative and negative preferences. 
Shareholder voting can achieve an important measure of shareholder 
accountability, despite the challenges of rational ignorance, once the normative 
focus is shifted to a model of shareholder voting as veto. Shareholder-voting 
reforms that focus on negative preferences, rather than their affirmative 
preferences, are less likely to run into the costs of reform commonly identified by 
opponents of shareholder activism while going a long way toward satisfying real 
concerns of shareholders and proponents of shareholder activism. Understanding 
negative preferences and their role in this context provides a better guide to what 
should be the effective goals of shareholder voting and the best directions for any 
efforts at reform to achieve those goals. 
B. The Shareholder Veto in Practice 
How well do shareholders exercise their veto, at least where they have it, under 
current law? Shareholders face voting decisions about two major categories of 
choices: First, shareholders vote on board nominees, major transactions, and 
management proposals, all of which are sponsored by management; second, 
shareholders vote on certain proposals by qualified shareholders, principally about 
matters of corporate governance, which management generally opposes. In both 
cases, shareholders overwhelmingly tend to defer to the board except under limited 
circumstances when deference rationally is less deserved. 
This general deference to the board, coupled with the institutional advantage of 
management, means that board-nominated candidates for director and proposals 
from management tend overwhelmingly to win approval from shareholders, just as 
management recommends.149 That is, in the context of large, publicly held 
companies, shareholders very rarely oppose management’s direction on proposals 
presented for a vote. Yair Listokin reports that management proposals receive on 
average 85% favorable votes and only 14% negative votes out of total votes cast.150 
By contrast, shareholder-sponsored proposals that do not usually enjoy 
management support receive on average just less than 32% favorable votes.151 
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What is more, even when the vote is close, Listokin finds that management 
proposals are overwhelmingly more likely to win votes by a small margin than to 
lose by a small margin.152 Indeed, other studies find that proposals from 
shareholders receive majority support less than 5% of the time.153 Management, in 
short, exercises sufficient control over the shareholder voting process that it usually 
can monitor, influence, and mobilize enough shareholder votes as needed, when 
needed, to win approval of proposals that it favors. 
However, shareholders shake out of their regular deference when company 
performance is poor. Shareholders, for instance, are least likely to defer to 
management and most likely to vote in favor of shareholder proposals when the 
company has underperformed.154 Although shareholders tend to defer as a general 
matter to management, shareholders’ trust in management erodes when the 
company performs badly and management’s competence appropriately comes into 
question. When deciding whether to defer to or veto management’s 
recommendations, shareholders focus on a discrete question informed by a standing 
opinion about management’s competence, which is in turn based heavily on 
retrospective information about share price. Share price offers a salient, accessible 
measure of performance that shareholders, even unsophisticated shareholders with 
relatively little information, can readily monitor over time as a proxy for 
competence. 
Shareholders are more likely, as a result, to engage in a proxy contest to 
challenge the incumbent board, and are also more likely to vote for challengers in a 
proxy contest, when company performance has been weak. The empirical literature 
is clear that companies are much more likely to face a proxy contest when their 
recent performance lags behind the industry standard. One study estimates that 
companies that face a proxy contest to the incumbent board have experienced 
34.4% lower stock returns and 39.3% lower income growth on average than 
comparable firms over the previous five years.155 
There is much less research about the degree to which shareholder support for a 
proxy challenger depends on the past performance of the incumbent board. Part of 
the reason for the paucity of research is that proxy contests are reasonably rare, 
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given the legal impediments to bringing a proxy challenge.156 However, as a rough 
descriptive statistic, one recent study finds that companies in which a proxy 
challenger wins the contested board’s seats experienced roughly 10% worse than 
average performance, as measured by five-year share price return indexed against 
the S&P 500, compared to roughly 5% better than average performance by 
companies where the proxy challenge was unsuccessful.157 
We know a great deal more about shareholder voting for shareholder proposals, 
and the available empirical literature finds conclusively that shareholder support for 
shareholder proposals is predictably associated with corporate 
underperformance.158 Compared to proxy contests, the costs of making shareholder 
proposals are substantially lower, and shareholders’ proposals are much more 
commonly presented for shareholder votes than for proxy contests. Lilli Gordon 
and John Pound study the relationship between shareholder support for shareholder 
proposals and the company’s long-term market return, and they find that poor stock 
market performance by the company is significantly related to voting support for 
shareholder proposals.159 As they summarize, “the worse is the long-term 
performance of the firm, the higher is the vote for shareholder proposals.”160 
Another study reaches essentially the same conclusion over a longer period of 
company performance and concludes that “[t]he poorer the performance over the 
previous five years, the higher the number of votes in favor of the shareholder 
proposal.”161 In other words, shareholders are most likely to buck management by 
voting for shareholder proposals against management’s usual recommendation 
when company underperformance seems to have undercut shareholders’ usual 
posture of deference. 
Shareholders also sensibly submit more shareholder proposals to 
underperforming companies.162 When the company performs poorly, not only are 
shareholders more likely to vote for shareholder proposals, management tends to be 
challenged by a greater number of proposals as well, usually from shareholders 
who hope to change the company’s direction. One study finds that the likelihood 
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that a company receives a shareholder proposal is inversely proportional to 
important measures of company performance during the three preceding years, 
such as market-to-book ratio, operating return on sales, and recent sales growth.163 
Another study finds that companies targeted by shareholder proposals performed 
significantly worse—indeed 22% worse—than the average market performance 
during the previous year.164 
However, shareholders do not reflexively support greater shareholder control, 
but instead shareholders’ preferences over process appear to depend on whether the 
company is managed well. At least when limited to simple binary questions that 
lend themselves to a veto choice, shareholders appear to behave rationally in favor 
of measures that generally benefit shareholders and enhance the value of their 
companies.165 Studies likewise show that shareholders appear to be sensitive to the 
sponsorship of a shareholder proposal in deciding whether to support it.166 
Specifically, studies find that proposals sponsored by institutional investors and 
prominent financial figures enjoy significantly greater support.167 Like voters in 
political elections, shareholders respond to the informational signal from counter-
endorsements against management’s position by trusted sources. This counter-
endorsement serves as a voting cue not to trust management’s position on the 
proposal and helps overcome shareholders’ usual deference. 
The one area where shareholders are most likely to buck management’s 
recommendation, even when company performance is satisfactory, actually 
strengthens the case for shareholder voting. Shareholders are most likely to vote in 
favor of a shareholder proposal over management objection when the proposal is 
familiar and empirically shown to enhance shareholder value. For instance, 
shareholders vote most consistently in support of well-known corporate governance 
proposals that dismantle a company’s anti-takeover devices.168 Anti-takeover 
devices insulate directors and officers from replacement by bidders who identify 
underperformance by the company and seek to capture gains from better 
management by taking over the company. This threat of a takeover better 
incentivizes managers and is associated empirically with shareholder value, while 
the presence of anti-takeover devices that deter takeovers is empirically associated 
with managerial underperformance.169 Shareholders, therefore, rationally should 
oppose anti-takeover devices and support measures to remove them in companies 
whose shares they own. That is what they do. 
Shareholders, for another example, oppose staggered boards and vote for 
proposals to eliminate them.170 Staggered boards, as empirical research has 
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demonstrated, depress the return to shareholders of takeover targets and are 
correlated with lower firm value.171 Staggered boards, by spreading out the term of 
individual directors and by staggering their election years, require any hostile 
bidder for a company to replace the incumbent board over a longer period of time. 
This elongation of the process raises costs and deters bidders and, therefore, 
reduces the threat of a takeover that would discipline managers and enhance 
shareholder value. In the most comprehensive study of staggered boards, Lucian 
Bebchuk, John Coates, and Guhan Subramanian document the negative effect of 
staggered boards on shareholder value and conclude that “staggered boards are the 
most powerful anti-takeover device in the current arsenal of takeover defense 
weapons.”172 For this reason, shareholder activists and corporate governance 
reformers advocate for the de-staggering of a company’s board as a way of 
removing obstacles to takeover bids and reinforcing shareholder value. 
Shareholders rationally tend to vote in favor of such proposals, and in fact, the 
approval rates for such proposals are often the highest for any category of 
shareholder proposal.173 Furthermore, shareholders also buck management 
opposition to these proposals because they know that the usual deference to 
management would be counter to their interests. Not only do shareholders support 
the de-staggering of boards, shareholders tend to provide strong support for the 
removal of other anti-takeover devices as well, such as poison pills.174 
However, shareholders do not vote indiscriminately for proposals styled as 
corporate governance reform and instead tend to vote against proposals with little 
or no empirical support as value enhancing for shareholders. Shareholders 
discriminate among corporate governance reforms and appear to support them 
selectively based at least in part on whether there is powerful consensus about their 
value.175 Shareholders support de-staggering boards on one hand, but on the other 
hand, shareholders are decidedly and rationally ambivalent, for instance, about say 
on pay advisory voting on executive compensation. Jie Cai and Ralph Walkling 
find that adoption of say on pay appears disfavored by the equity markets and 
companies.176 Consistent with this finding, proposals for say on pay generally do 
not receive majority support of shareholders.177 Cai and Walkling also find, 
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however, that shareholders depart from the usual disapproval for say on pay and 
tend to vote for say on pay’s institution when the CEO of the company is 
overpaid.178 Shareholder support for say on pay therefore appears to be tepid in 
most cases when say on pay would do little good, but shareholder support for its 
institution rationally increases when say on pay is responsive to excessive 
executive compensation.179 Other proposals that receive weak shareholder support 
“can be viewed as more qualitative and difficult for shareholders to analyze,” such 
as measures to change the compensation of executives, the selection of auditors, 
and the composition of the board.180 
A criticism of expanded proxy access for shareholders is that it would place too 
much leverage in the hands of a few major shareholders who can exploit their 
consolidated control and the diffusion of the remaining market capitalization.181 
This worry may be particularly acute today with the rise of activist hedge funds 
eager to take large positions in a company and to use that leverage to dominate 
corporate policy.182 Activist hedge funds might be motivated to sponsor proposals, 
under expanded proxy access provided by current reforms, that benefit their narrow 
interests rather than shareholders as a class. Bainbridge argues that proxy reform 
that would expand shareholder voting rights “seems likely to disrupt the very 
mechanism that makes the widely held public corporation practicable: namely, the 
centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in the board 
of directors.”183   Intrusive activism by hedge funds is a relatively new phenomenon 
and may well become problematic, perhaps even requiring new legal inventions, 
such as fiduciary duties for activist shareholders, as some argue.184 
There is thus far, however, only limited evidence of the costs of hedge fund 
activism. More important, shareholders generally do not appear unduly attracted to 
value-reducing measures when asked to vote on them and appear to vote rationally 
in favor of many significant measures that appear to advantage shareholders as a 
class. In other words, simply because shareholders are presented with value-
reducing proposals does not mean that shareholders will vote for and approve them. 
Shareholders defend their negative preferences against harmful or wasteful 
proposals reasonably well. This is particularly so when management regards certain 
proposals as harmful or wasteful and communicates that opinion to shareholders. If 
anything, the principal concern today appears to be that shareholder voting tends to 
defer to management too much. 
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IV. THE REFORM IMPLICATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING AS VETO  
The practice of shareholder voting as veto offers a few suggestions about how 
sensibly shareholders can exercise their veto and thus provides a model upon which 
to build reform. Shareholder-voting reform that builds upon the strengths of 
shareholders is likely to be more successful than blanket critics of shareholder 
voting currently allege. 
However, the prognosis is less clear for shareholder-voting reform that goes 
beyond the revealed strengths of shareholders as defenders of the negative 
preferences through veto voting. Shareholder-voting reform that asks shareholders 
to make more difficult judgments beyond their veto oversight of management 
presents challenges that shareholders have less experience in handling. In short, the 
practice of shareholder voting as veto, once understood as such, demonstrates what 
works about shareholder voting and where it can build in terms of reform, and it 
also makes clear where shareholder-voting reform might go wrong. 
A. Building on the Shareholder Veto 
Any reform of shareholder voting can effectively build on the strengths of 
shareholders as veto decisionmakers in response to management. Shareholders 
effectively monitor management and sensibly exercise their veto in light of that 
monitoring. The usual critiques of shareholder voting fall away to a significant 
degree if shareholders are competent at exercising their veto and if voting decisions 
are structured to suit that competence. 
Most prominent among new voting matters for shareholders in recent years is 
say on pay. As described earlier, say on pay requires a company to hold a 
nonbinding shareholder vote on the company’s executive compensation. Say on 
pay as a concept dates back at least to the early 1990s185 but was only recently 
adopted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act.186 Dodd-Frank requires both an inaugural vote on companies’ executive 
compensation, as well as a separate shareholder vote on how frequently say on pay 
votes should be held going forward.187 
Early criticism of say on pay in its first year of practice focused on the fact that 
shareholders actually tended not to reject executive pay even after receiving the 
opportunity to vote against it. John Helyar reported that Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) advised its clients to vote no on executive pay for 293 companies, 
accounting for roughly 12% of its recommendations, midway through 2011.188 
However, only thirty-two companies received a negative shareholder vote on 
executive pay, out of a total of 1998 companies that held annual meetings midway 
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through 2011—just 2% of those companies.189 Nearly three-quarters of companies 
in the Russell 3000 passed their executive compensation with more than 90% 
shareholder approval.190 As one proxy advisor observed, the big institutional 
investors “won’t vote against management . . . unless they’re really bad.”191 
This pattern of shareholder deference in the absence of poor management 
performance is perfectly predictable. Shareholders are unlikely to prioritize 
executive compensation, which generally accounts for a very small percentage of 
any public company’s expenses.192 As a result, shareholders are unlikely to 
intervene unless management performance is sufficiently bad that it forces 
shareholders to pay greater attention as a general matter and contemplate the more 
aggressive exercise of a veto even on executive compensation. An earlier empirical 
study on say on pay indicated accordingly that proposals to institute say on pay 
from 2006 to 2008, before the passage of Dodd-Frank, did not tend to receive 
majority shareholder approval and averaged less than 30% of shareholder 
support.193 In other words, shareholders did not reflexively vote for measures to 
curb executive pay. Shareholder support for instituting say on pay increases almost 
exclusively when the company’s CEO actually is overpaid.194 In short, shareholder 
voting in support of instituting say on pay is fairly reasonable so far as it goes. 
The widespread introduction of say on pay actually channels shareholder 
dissatisfaction with executive compensation into more manageable, less intrusive 
directions. Say on pay allows shareholders a direct channel of expression about 
executive compensation that was previously unavailable. Before say on pay, 
shareholders who wished to vent frustration with executive compensation were 
forced to express their discontent only indirectly, by withholding support from 
director candidates and compensation committee nominees. With the introduction 
of say on pay, those crude expressions of shareholder dissatisfaction decreased.195 
As ISS reported, “[t]he advent of ‘say on pay’ has contributed to a significant 
decline in shareholder opposition to director elections at U.S. firms in 2011.”196 
For precisely these reasons, sweeping criticism of say on pay is difficult to 
understand. Stephen Bainbridge argues that say on pay, by involving even this 
limited measure of shareholder preference into corporate decisionmaking, “seems 
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable; 
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namely, the vesting of ‘authoritative control’ in the board of directors.”197 This 
intrusion by shareholders is disruptive because “[f]or the average shareholder, the 
necessary investment of time and effort in making informed voting decisions 
simply is not worthwhile.”198 But it is for this reason that the average shareholder is 
quite unlikely in the usual case to depart from the dominant pattern of deferring to 
management, just as Bainbridge would advise. In this case, shareholders would 
defer to authoritative board control, just as shareholder voting in 2011 appears to 
bear out, rather than disrupt it.199 If “executive perks seem to be set with 
shareholder interests in mind,”200 as Bainbridge contends, then shareholders are 
rightly endorsing management’s position on the issue. Shareholders would tend to 
vote against management’s proposed executive compensation mainly when 
company performance has been rocky enough to jar shareholders’ attention and 
trigger potentially negative preference and scrutiny about management suggestions. 
Shareholder voting, on say on pay and otherwise, is heavily influenced by the 
recommendation of important proxy advisors. Proxy advisors—most prominently 
ISS but also PROXY Governance, Inc., Glass, Lewis & Company, and others—
make recommendations to their institutional clients about how they should cast 
their proxy in shareholder voting matters.201 ISS, for instance, offers its clients 
voting recommendations on all shareholder voting questions as well as a research 
report supporting those recommendations.202 ISS’s recommendations in particular 
carry great weight among its clients and are credited with being able to sway as 
much as 30% of the vote in any proxy contest.203 One study of mutual fund voting 
observes that “mutual funds tend to vote in line with ISS recommendations across 
the board.”204 
The fact that shareholders might rely on a heuristic voting cue from the 
endorsements of proxy advisors is utterly unsurprising. Voters in similar large-scale 
electorates regularly rely on heuristic cue-taking from credible agents who are 
perceived to have the same values and can be reasonably trusted to offer the 
recommendation that the voter would have reached with the investment of time and 
thought.205 These agents in the context of political voting are called political 
parties, trusted political endorsers, and various media figures among others. When 
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a popular politican, respected pundit, or trusted interest group whose position the 
voter values offers a voting recommendation, the voter can rely on that 
recommendation as an economizing device. Just so, shareholders rely on ISS’s 
recommendation to the degree that they trust ISS’s judgments to be consistent with 
their own. Of course, shareholders cannot be confident that ISS’s recommendation 
is always perfectly consistent with what would be their independent judgment. To 
the degree that ISS’s recommendations prove unreliable over a longer period, 
shareholders will lose confidence in ISS and depart from their recommendation in 
favor of greater independence, or more likely a different proxy advisor. To expect 
shareholders to depend less on heuristic cues than voters in virtually every other 
mass voting context is simply unrealistic and unproductive. 
As a result, it is difficult to sympathize with the abstract concerns about say on 
pay, particularly structured as a nonbinding veto of management decision making. 
What is more, the success of shareholder voting as veto should bode well for the 
sensibility of shareholder voting on other potential avenues of reform that take a 
similar path. Most prominently, corporate governance reformers have pushed for 
shareholder rights of approval for corporate campaign expenditures in the wake of 
Citizens United v. FEC.206 That Supreme Court decision held that longstanding 
government prohibitions on corporate expenditures on political campaigning were 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.207 The decision therefore raised the 
possibility that the usual principal-agent concerns about management discretion 
would extend to corporate campaign spending against the preferences of company 
shareholders.208 
The Shareholder Protection Act would require shareholder approval of a 
company’s campaign contributions and expenditures in a binding vote that 
basically follows the model of say on pay.209 Management would need to obtain 
majority shareholder approval in advance of corporate campaign contributions or 
expenditures. This requirement again enables shareholders to reject management’s 
recommendations through a shareholder veto, but it would not by itself empower 
shareholders to propose any corporate contributions or expenditures as an 
alternative to management’s preference. 
The Shareholder Protection Act’s requirement of shareholder approval for 
corporate electioneering is consistent with the model of shareholder voting as veto. 
Shareholders are likely to defer overwhelmingly to management, particularly when 
the company is performing well, regardless of their individual political preferences 
distinct from the company’s political agenda. Rationally ignorant shareholders 
would go along with management recommendations except when poor company 
performance alerts them to closer monitoring of management and activates 
potential negative preferences against management’s recommendations. 
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Indeed, this pattern is exactly what Ciara Torres-Spelliscy and Kathy Fogel find 
in their study of the United Kingdom’s parallel experience with the U.K. 
Companies Act.210 Like the Shareholder Protection Act, the enacted U.K. 
Companies Act requires British companies to seek shareholder approval of their 
political budgets.211 Although several companies avoided the Act’s requirements by 
proposing no political spending at all, British companies tended overwhelmingly to 
seek and obtain shareholder approval for more political spending than they actually 
ended up making. On average, companies received 94%–97% approval for their 
proposed budgets from shareholders voting their shares, with an annual average of 
a third to half of shares abstaining or otherwise failing to vote.212 Shareholders 
deferred to management in almost all cases such that any disruption is likely to be 
minimal in all but the exceptional case. And the empirical evidence from 
shareholder voting suggests that the exceptional case is likely to be one where 
shareholders sensibly intervene more aggressively against management.213 
Admittedly, campaign spending in the United Kingdom is much less than in the 
United States,214 but it is precisely with respect to political concerns where 
shareholders are likely to be most deferential to management. Shareholders are very 
hostile to political appeals that do not relate directly to returns on shareholder 
value.215 Shareholders vote in waves against shareholder proposals based on so-
called social responsibility and political concerns.216 Shareholders tend to be 
narrowly focused on maximizing their returns and accordingly defer to 
management on most politically salient matters that are unlikely to involve serious 
issues of corporate profitability. It is with respect to corporate governance matters, 
where shareholders’ financial interests can conflict most acutely with 
management’s, that shareholders pay special attention and are most likely to vote 
against management’s recommendations. 
B. Reinforcing the Shareholder Veto 
Where the shareholder veto is practically ineffective under current law, 
shareholder-voting reform directed toward the effective exercise of a shareholder 
veto plays to the strengths of shareholders as veto overseers of management. 
Shareholder-voting reform can unlock the ability of shareholders to defend their 
interests effectively through their veto, just as they do effectively in other areas of 
corporate governance. 
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One opportunity for reinforcing shareholder veto rights is board elections. As a 
formal matter, shareholders have the right to withhold their votes from 
management nominees for the board of directors. They can thus formally express a 
negative preference against management in the formal sense. However, this formal 
ability to withhold their votes and express disapproval has little practical 
consequence. The reason for this fact is that under current law, it is very costly, and 
therefore extremely rare, for shareholders or other interests to run competing 
candidates against management’s nominees in a proxy fight. As a result, almost all 
management nominees run unopposed even when there is dissatisfaction with those 
nominees among shareholders.217 
In this situation, when only management’s nominees are presented for a proxy 
vote, management’s nominee wins with even a single vote as the highest eligible 
vote getter. Shareholders can vote against the nominees presented by management, 
but the effect of that nay vote is formally negligible. Without any effective veto 
power, dissatisfied shareholders have increasingly voted against or withheld their 
votes for board nominees as a show of dissatisfaction, even though virtually all of 
those nominees would be elected regardless of their votes or nonvotes.218 While 
these campaigns to withhold votes may spur management to negotiate with 
dissatisfied shareholders, there is no formal mechanism by which shareholders can 
exercise a veto in the same way that they can on other management proposals. 
The SEC’s proposed amendments to Rules 14a-8 and 14a-11 were aimed at 
reinforcing the shareholder veto when it comes to board elections. The amendments 
would have given shareholders much greater leverage to veto management 
nominees for the board by making it much easier for qualified shareholders to offer 
alternative candidates for the board of directors against management’s nominees.219 
Shareholders who have owned, individually or as part of a shareholder group, at 
least 3% of outstanding shares for the previous three years, would have been able to 
nominate a nominee for the board of directors to be included in the company’s 
proxy materials, subject to certain limitations.220 This qualification of ownership 
stake would help ensure that only significant shareholders with financial interests in 
the company exercise this option. Those nominating shareholders would need to 
make certain disclosures in advance, as well as promise to hold their shares through 
the annual meeting.221 The critical element of the SEC’s proposed amendments was 
the nominating shareholders’ right to include their nominee in the company’s proxy 
materials, distributed to all shareholders at the company’s cost.222 This right of 
inclusion in the company’s proxy materials avoided the need for the nominating 
shareholders to distribute their own proxy materials, subject to federal securities 
law, at high, usually prohibitive financial cost. 
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Although it is easy to see these proposals as aimed at empowering shareholders 
to name their ideal set of candidates, they are better understood in light of the fact 
that current law provides little opportunity for shareholder veto in board elections. 
As such, the SEC’s proposals served a more modest, and more important, purpose. 
The proposed changes to Rules 14a-8 and 14a-11 would have made it more likely, 
when shareholders are unhappy with the board, to have a real chance to veto the 
board’s nominee by voting for an alternate candidate. If shareholders are able to 
include competing nominees against the management candidates in the company’s 
proxy materials, shareholders as voters will have a true alternative, and therefore 
the chance to veto when the circumstances are right. Management candidates would 
need to receive more votes than a competing nominee, and the number of 
shareholder votes against them would matter. The nomination proposals therefore 
made more meaningful the shareholders’ right of veto that they have in theory, but 
not in practice, under current law. 
To honor the negative preferences of shareholders, corporate democracy should 
permit shareholders to effectively veto some meaningful level of management 
discretion with which they do not agree.223 That is, even under Stephen 
Bainbridge’s most skeptical account, shareholder voting must serve at least as “an 
accountability device of last resort” that can be exercised effectively in practice, if 
shareholder voting is to be useful at all.224 Where management nominees run 
unopposed under plurality voting rules, shareholders have virtually no ability to 
impose any accountability or exercise the necessary veto power.225 If shareholder 
interests in corporate governance are primarily negative preferences at their heart, 
then shareholders may desire stronger mechanisms for veto oversight on matters 
they already vote on but have little practical veto power over.226 
The D.C. Circuit, however, enjoined SEC implementation and enforcement of 
its amendments to Rules 14a-8 and 14a-11 in Business Roundtable v. SEC.227 The 
decision found that the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, in failing to consider adequately the economic 
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consequences of the amendments pursuant to federal law.228 The amendments, by 
expanding shareholders’ access to the company’s proxy materials, would have 
increased the number of contested board seats and generate company expense to the 
degree that management chose to oppose shareholder nominees through active 
solicitation and campaigning for its nominees. These costs would be minimized, 
according to the SEC, by the fact that shareholder access to the company’s proxy 
would be limited under the amendments to shareholders with sufficient stake in the 
company such that frequent or wasteful nominations would be unlikely.229 Any 
costs from frequent or wasteful nominations, the theory for the amendments went, 
should be offset by shareholder gains in spurring board performance through better 
incentives and membership. That, of course, is the theory for encouraging 
shareholder nominations adopted by the SEC. However, in light of what the court 
viewed as “admittedly (and at best) ‘mixed’ empirical evidence,” the court ruled 
that the SEC had not sufficiently supported its judgment that shareholder 
nomination through expanded proxy access would “result in improved board and 
company performance and shareholder value.”230 
The D.C. Circuit penalized the SEC for the relative lack of existing empirical 
research on shareholder nominations through greater proxy access.231 The court 
acted on its concerns about encouraging shareholder nominations, siding with the 
Business Roundtable, in the absence of powerful evidence in either direction.232 
There is evidence that the SEC proposals were valued by the financial markets for 
their potential to improve company performance and shareholder value.233 The SEC 
announced in October 2010 that it would be forced to delay implementation of its 
proposals as a result of the Business Roundtable litigation.234 The announcement 
provided a natural experiment that revealed the degree to which the markets valued 
the SEC proposals’ effect on affected companies.235 Bo Becker, Daniel 
Bergstresser, and Guhan Subramanian found that firms with substantial 
institutional ownership, the companies likely to be most affected by the SEC 
proposals, lost market value following the announcement.236 
As the market response suggests, the SEC’s proposals need not burden 
companies and board management as much as the D.C. Circuit feared in Business 
Roundtable. Of course, the board would still present its nominees, and an 
overwhelming amount of the time, those nominees will win board seats whether the 
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election is contested or not. Any competing candidates nominated separately by 
shareholders would need to win a plurality of votes from voters who tend in the 
normal course to be rationally ignorant about company specifics and reluctant to 
deviate from the board’s recommendations. The important effect of the SEC 
proposals would have been that unhappy shareholders would have had a 
meaningful outlet for their dissatisfaction when they were not pleased with 
company performance. They would have had the option of voting for someone else, 
namely the shareholder’s nominee, and thus had the opportunity for a real veto that 
they almost never possess in board elections. 
Majority voting rules for board elections serve a similar purpose in reinforcing 
shareholders’ negative preferences. They require director candidates to receive at 
least a majority of eligible shareholder votes for election to the board.237 Under the 
traditional plurality rule, even if every shareholder vote but one is withheld—that 
is, not cast for the lone candidate as the only available signal of disapproval—the 
board’s candidate still will be elected. The requirement that uncontested candidates 
receive at least a majority of shareholder votes cast helps unhappy shareholders to 
veto the election of disfavored candidates.238 For this reason, Senator Charles 
Schumer included a mandatory majority voting rule in his “Shareholder Bill of 
Rights,” introduced in May 2009 just ahead of the SEC proposals.239 
Majority voting rules, in fact, have their roots in earlier shareholder movements 
to withhold votes from underperforming boards purely as an expression of negative 
preference.240 Withholding votes from a nominee running in an uncontested 
election had little formal consequence under plurality voting rules, but institutional 
investors nonetheless hoped that withholding votes from board candidates would 
publicly signal some critical mass of shareholder discontent. Withholding votes 
offered a way to communicate a negative preference, where no other avenue for 
shareholder negative expression and veto was available, that might prod the 
incumbent board into greater responsiveness to shareholder concerns. If nothing 
else,241 majority voting rules offer an outlet to highlight such lack of support for 
candidates by denying majority approval. 
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Again, majority voting rules need not extend the scope of shareholder 
involvement in company affairs when applied only to situations where shareholder 
approval is already required. Majority voting rules do not provide shareholders new 
opportunities to propose new courses of action or interfere with the daily operations 
of the company. They mainly offer shareholders greater opportunity to veto the 
board’s nominees in those limited circumstances when the shareholders are 
sufficiently dissatisfied to act against the board. What is more, the swift adoption of 
majority voting rules by so many companies in recent years suggests that 
shareholder demand for this type of limited reinforcement of shareholder veto 
rights has increased. 
Of course, there remains considerable room for debate about the optimal level of 
shareholder oversight and opportunity for veto. None of this dictates the precise 
amount of shareholder leverage over the board that would be optimal for 
maximizing shareholder value. In Bebchuk’s view, almost any empowerment of 
shareholder activism is a move in the right direction because the balance of power 
is swung so harmfully in the direction of board autonomy under current law. In the 
view of Bainbridge, Lynn Stout, and other opponents of shareholder activism, 
almost any empowerment of shareholder prerogatives is a move in the wrong 
direction. They view any increase in shareholder leverage over the board as a threat 
to centralized management in the best interests of the company.242 These two sides, 
proponents and opponents of shareholder activism, stand far apart in their views. 
However, an emphasis on shareholders’ negative preferences and veto rights 
comes closer to addressing the concerns of both sides. Shareholders as a class can 
effectively exercise their negative preferences, without excessively interfering with 
management, only if their option of negative veto has some teeth. Only 
shareholders with even more vehement objections to board decision making must 
sell their shares. 
C. Shareholder Rights of Initiation Versus Shareholder Voting as Veto 
A final lesson from an understanding of negative preferences is a distinction 
between reform that effectuates shareholders’ affirmative preferences and 
shareholders’ negative preferences. On one hand, as I describe above, shareholder 
voting power could be increased by reinforcing their rights of oversight and veto 
over the board. There may be need to reinforce shareholder power, and expand it, 
but to do so mainly by bolstering the shareholders’ familiar veto rights, which 
effectuate only negative, not affirmative, authority. On the other hand, shareholder 
voting power could be increased by providing greater ability for shareholders to 
effectuate their affirmative preferences over company policy through new rights of 
initiation. Such reforms would not only increase shareholder control but would do 
so by expanding shareholder prerogatives beyond the usual shareholder veto, and 
instead look more squarely to shareholder affirmative preferences about the best 
paths for the company, irrespective of management direction. 
Most prominently, Lucian Bebchuk advocates “[i]ncreasing shareholder power 
to intervene” affirmatively, giving shareholders the power “to initiate and vote on 
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proposals regarding specific corporate decisions.”243 The shareholder veto “does 
not help shareholders to effect changes when the board prefers the status quo,” nor 
does it “secure the arrangement that would best serve shareholder interests.”244 
Bebchuk proposes reforms that would expand shareholder power beyond 
effectuation of negative preferences to the direct effectuation of affirmative 
preferences through rights of initiation. For instance, Bebchuk proposes that, 
subject to certain conditions, shareholders be empowered to initiate “rules-of-the-
game decisions” to amend the corporate charter or reincorporate in another state, in 
addition to “game-ending” decisions, and “scaling-down” decisions.245 Bebchuk 
therefore suggests that shareholders be permitted to override management 
discretion over fundamental affirmative decisions, such as putting the company up 
for sale, beginning a process of dissolution, distributing dividends, and accepting 
particular merger or consolidation proposals offered by a bidder—all decisions 
currently entrusted to management’s exclusive initiation.246 
Other proposals are less sweeping but similar in their affirmative spirit. Even 
before Bebchuk, Robert Thompson and Gordon Smith had earlier proposed that 
shareholders be able to “initiate action that would put the company up for sale.”247 
Along similar lines, Julian Velasco proposes that shareholders be authorized to 
initiate an auction of the company by a majority vote of outstanding shares.248 
Shareholders would be able to demand that the board sell all the company’s shares 
or assets to the highest bidder. For his part, Lawton Hawkins proposes that, as a 
response to excessive executive compensation, shareholders be empowered by 
bylaw to appoint nonexecutive compensation representatives.249 The three largest 
eligible shareholders of the company would gain the power to appoint a 
representative who would act at their direction on all compensation committee 
meetings and all board of directors meetings that concern CEO compensation.250 
These proposed reforms seek to grant shareholders a different kind of 
prerogative than reforms that seek mainly to reinforce a shareholder veto. Such a 
change would more clearly alter the traditional split of authority between 
shareholders and management, and it is useful to distinguish between this move and 
efforts simply to reinforce shareholder veto rights with reference to the different 
type of shareholder preference they seek to effectuate. Rights of initiation by 
shareholders represent a more direct intrusion on management’s centralized control 
and unique expertise regarding company affairs. As such, proposals such as 
Bebchuk’s are motivated by a vision of shareholder voting directed toward 
shareholders’ affirmative preferences over the best course of action for the 
company, rather than a simple veto over management discretion. To the point, 
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Bebchuk’s major concern about the negative structure of shareholder voting is that 
“veto power does not help shareholders to effect changes” and “would not secure 
the arrangement that would best serve shareholder interests.”251 
 Of course, there are times when shareholders may wish to override 
management’s discretion in value-enhancing directions that management, for self-
interested reasons, would otherwise oppose. Here, a wider and more far-reaching 
range of shareholder rights of initiation might be attractive. What is more, the 
opportunity for motivated shareholders to propose affirmative actions by the 
corporation under Bebchuk’s proposal might put before the shareholders more 
value-enhancing options that the shareholders might happily embrace, even if they 
would not have invested the resources to develop as a collective. Shareholders 
might then have greater ability to approve value-enhancing measures that would 
otherwise be discouraged by current law and blocked by management efforts. 
However, it is important to underscore the difference between stronger rights of 
oversight and veto aimed at negative preferences on one hand, and Bebchuk’s 
proposal for rights of initiation on the other hand. Bainbridge argues that “giving 
investors [the] power of review differs little from giving them the power to make 
management decisions in the first place.”252 But there are important differences in 
the (i) degree of ex ante interference with management direction and (ii) the 
informational demands on shareholders as voters. 
First, rights of initiation do more than simply require management to obtain 
some requisite level of ex post shareholder consent for their decisions. They permit 
shareholders to direct the company in the first instance toward choices that the 
management opposes, and they tend to require extensive efforts from some 
initiating shareholder who is likely to emerge only because her economic 
motivations diverge from the average shareholder’s interests. By contrast, oversight 
through negative veto should pose less interference with the benefits of centralized 
board management than the affirmative rights of initiation that Bebchuk proposes. 
Rights of negative veto can be structured such that shareholders as a class are 
presented with binary choices that require little more than a single-shot ex post 
decision on an agenda shaped largely by management. This economy of decision 
making allows shareholders to delegate operation of the company to specialized 
management, but retain some meaningful check on management necessary in light 
of the inherent agency problem in corporate governance. The negative structure of 
shareholder voting better negotiates this tension between managerial discretion and 
accountability that Bainbridge and others identify. 
Second, proposals for new rights of initiation by shareholders present a 
materially different framework for shareholder voting. As I have explained, the 
veto structure of shareholder voting conforms to the preferences of shareholders. 
Shareholders generally limit their decision making to whether to veto management 
in a simple binary choice—for any action recommended by management, 
shareholders’ usual deference to management is guided in large part by their 
standing opinion of management. Beyond these management proposals, the only 
voting matters that garner serious consideration from shareholders pertain to 
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corporate governance measures about which shareholders, particularly institutional 
shareholders, tend to have their own standing opinions. As Brett McDonnell 
explains, shareholders are “likely to be rather well-informed on such issues” 
because “many corporate governance issues . . . are likely to arise at many different 
corporations, raising the same general questions at each.”253 In other words, 
shareholders are able to decide almost every question of shareholder voting under 
current law based largely on their standing opinions about management and well-
established corporate governance measures such de-staggering boards and poison 
pills. 
By contrast, wider rights of initiation for shareholders potentially complicate 
this neat economy of decision making. For example, Bebchuk’s proposal would 
empower a qualified shareholder to propose putting the company up for sale, or 
begin a process of dissolution, among other things.254 To decide how to vote on 
such matters, shareholders can again refer to management’s position on the 
question, but when shareholder proposals go beyond established measures of 
corporate governance, shareholders need more information to evaluate such 
questions of business strategy on their substantive merits. On such questions, as 
critics of shareholder voting reform argue, shareholders do not enjoy any 
informational advantages over management. Nor are shareholders as easily able to 
fall back on their heuristic judgments about the proposers’ credibility. Shareholders 
are unlikely in these cases to know much about the proposing shareholders 
competence or motivations, relative to what they know about management. 
Shareholders may need instead to engage in the open-ended inquiry necessary to 
determine one’s affirmative preference about the company’s best course of action. 
None of this is necessarily to say conclusively that Bebchuk’s proposal, nor 
other proposals for wider rights of initiation by shareholders, are bad ideas. Such 
approaches may be useful, but they complicate the usual economy of decision 
making by shareholders. They require judgments from shareholders about not only 
management, but assessments of their fellow shareholders’ credibility and 
motivations across a wide range of potential issues. Rights of initiation diverge 
from the usual strengths of shareholder voting as veto and require more difficult 
judgments. Bebchuk’s proposal would present voting decisions that are at least as 
complicated as the most difficult judgments that shareholders currently make, and 
at their most complicated, much more difficult judgments than shareholders 
currently make. Shareholders would need to develop something closer to 
affirmative preferences and therefore would need better information, or at least 
alternative heuristics that can be cheaply and reliably acquired. In this sense, rights 
of affirmative initiation for shareholders represent a bigger break from the usual 
understanding and practices of shareholder voting. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lasting value of understanding shareholder voting as veto is a re-orientation 
of the debate about shareholder voting. This active debate, as it always has been, 
pits those who desire a higher quantum of shareholder influence against those who 
fear any increase of shareholder influence over corporate management. This Article 
argues that the shape of shareholder influence through shareholder voting matters 
as much as its quantity. Shareholder-voting reform that builds upon this model of 
shareholder voting as veto offers the most certain path to balancing the basic 
tension between shareholder oversight and an efficient norm of management of 
discretion. The insights of shareholder voting as veto provide a useful model as 
pressure builds for shareholder-voting reform and as new iterations of reform 
become politically viable as never before, particularly at the federal level. 
  
